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MAKING OUR CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS MORE COMPETITIVE; A
PROPOSAL FOR A LIMITED NUMBER OF
STATEWIDE AT-LARGE ELECTIONS IN
OUR MORE POPULOUS STATES
WALTER M. FRANK"

INTRODUCTION

Seriously contested election campaigns "educate voters"' and
provide "evaluative accountability that legitimates the chosen
representatives."
Unfortunately, competitive elections for the
House of Representatives reached an all time low in 2002 and
2004.'
While the statistical support for both the need and
appropriateness of the proposal advanced in this article for a
limited number of statewide at large elections in our more
populous states was based primarily on the elections of 2002 and
2004, a preliminary analysis of the 2006 election returns shows
how markedly uncompetitive most House elections remain even in
a year marked by extreme voter discontent. Eighty-six percent of
the House races, for example, were still decided by more than ten
percentage points. The problem remains particularly acute in our
more populous states to which the proposal is addressed. In
Missouri, Tennessee, Virginia and New Jersey, all with highly
contested Senate races decided (except for New Jersey) by
extremely narrow margins, only two of the combined forty-two
House races were decided by a margin of ten points or less. In
The author retired in 2005 as Chief of Commercial Litigation
of the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey after 30 years of service with the
Authority. He earned his B.A. from the University of Pennsylvania in 1967,
his J.D. from Columbia University Law School in 1970 and an L.L.M in Labor
Law from New York University Law School in 1978.
1. Samuel Issacharoff, Why Elections?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 684, 685 (2002).
2. Id.
3. See Sam Hirsch, The United States House of Unrepresentatives: What
Went Wrong in the Latest Round of CongressionalRedistricting,2 ELECTION

L.J. 179, 182 (2003) (discussing the lack of competitiveness in House of
Representative elections throughout the country). Speaking of the 2002
Congressional elections, Hirsch writes: "On average, the 435 victorious
candidates won a higher percentage of the popular vote than in any House
election in more than half a century." Id.
1425
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Missouri and Tennessee no race was actually decided by less than
twenty points notwithstanding that the Senate races were decided
by 2 and 2.7 points respectively. Moreover, the vast majority of
the House races in our eight most populous states (the primary
In
focus of the proposal) continued to be non-competitive.
California, for example, with fifty-three electoral districts, only
five races were decided by twenty points or less. It is interesting
also that Pennsylvania, which accounted for five of the fourteen
changeover seats coming from the eight largest states, had a
highly partisan gerrymander in 2001 in which incumbent
protection was sacrificed to produce more Republican seats.
Ironically, in sea change years, highly partisan gerrymanders
might be one of our few routes to greater competitiveness.
Liberals and conservatives alike have decried the effect that
the limited number of competitive districts has had on our politics.
Thomas Mann, a noted scholar at the Brookings Institution, and
Michael McConnell, a Professor of Law at Harvard frequently
mentioned as a possible Bush nominee for the Supreme Court,
both assess the current situation in strikingly similar terms.
Professor McConnell has written that currently:
[I]ncumbents are rendered effectively secure, which enables them to
legislate without real political accountability - and especially
without fear that members of the other party will be able to unseat
them. Indeed, with politically homogeneous districts, incumbents
are more likely to face challenges from within their party, which
tend to be from the ideological extremes. This creates an incentive
against moderation in politics and is one reason why the House of
Representatives, which is heavily gerrymandered, is more politically
polarized than the Senate.4
Dr. Mann recently wrote:
The legitimacy of the American electoral system requires some level
of adherence to the principles of fairness, responsiveness and
accountability. Recent elections to the U.S. House of
Representatives threaten those principles. Congressional contests
suffer from an unusually high degree of incumbent safety, a
precipitous decline in competitiveness, growing ideological
polarization, and a fierce struggle between the major parties to
manipulate the rules of the game to achieve, maintain, or enlarge
majority control of the chamber. 5
Studies seem to confirm a connection between competitive
elections and greater moderation: "there is evidence at the
4. Michael W. McConnell, The RedistrictingCases: Original Mistakes and
Current Consequences, 24 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 103, 113 (2000).
5. Thomas E. Mann, RedistrictingReform: What is Desirable?Possible?, in
PARTY

LINES:

COMPETITION,

PARTISANSHIP,

AND

CONGRESSIONAL

REDISTRICTING 92 (Thomas E. Mann and Bruce E. Cain eds., 2005)
[hereinafter PARTY LINES].
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individual district level that more competitive seats lead to more
moderate members and that 'cross-pressured' members are more
likely to have more centrist voting scores."'
To encourage more competitive House elections, this article
proposes that Congress utilize its Article I, Section 4 power 7 to
require that states with eight to fourteen representatives elect one
representative at-large through a statewide vote, those with
fifteen to twenty-one representatives elect two statewide, and
States having twenty-two or more representatives elect three
statewide. I also propose that states having less than eight
representatives be given the option, but not required, to have one
statewide elected representative. If these requirements had been
in effect for the post 2000 census redistricting, then thirty-three
at-large races would have occurred in a total of twenty-one states
and an equal number of congressional districts in those states
would have been eliminated.8
The Supreme Court does not view lack of competition as a
constitutional problem, and in fact has looked favorably on
redistricting for the purpose of protecting Congressional
incumbents.9 While the Court has recognized that excessive
partisan gerrymandering can theoretically be a constitutional
violation,' ° no standard has been agreed upon by the Court, and in
a recent case four of the Justices declared that, after almost two
decades of trying, it was time to give up the effort and treat
partisan gerrymandering as non-justiciable."
It seems clear at this point that constitutional challenges to
either
partisan
gerrymanders
or incumbent
protection
gerrymanders will not serve to expand competitiveness for
Congressional elections. For reasons discussed in more detail

6. Bruce E. Cain, Karin McDonald, & Michael McDonald, From Equality
to Fairness:The Path of PoliticalReform since Baker v. Carr, in PARTY LINES,
supra note 5, at 21.
7. Paragraph one reads as follows: "The Times, Places, and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in
each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by
Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the places of choosing
Senators." U.S. CONST. art I, §4.
8. One at-large election would have occurred in Arizona, Georgia, Indiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Minnesota, New Jersey, North Carolina,
Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin; two at-large elections in
Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania; and three at-large elections in

Florida, California, New York and Texas.
9. See Gaffney v. Cummings 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973) (noting that political
districts are unavoidably drawn to benefit one political party or another);
White v. Weiser 412 U.S. 783, 791-792 (1973) (decided on the same day as
Gaffney stating that the court does not disparage the interest in drawing

district lines to protect incumbent).
10. Davis v. Bandemer 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
11. Vieth v. Jubelirer 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
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independent
below, neither bi-partisan nor non-partisan
commissions, nor the adoption of so called neutral criteria are
likely to result in a major shift to more competitive House
elections. The solution, if there is to be one, needs to be national
in scope, fair, and direct.
The proposal for statewide at-large elections is premised on
the belief that statewide races have the potential to be much more
competitive than district races since: (a) many states are fairly
evenly divided along partisan lines; (b) ticket splitting and the
greater media attention on statewide races create more fluid
dynamics that can result in more competitive elections even when
one party enjoys a substantial edge in registered voters; (c) certain
advantages of incumbency are less significant in a statewide race;
and (d) the moderate and independent voter is likely to have a
greater impact in such races. As this article will show, this
premise is supported by a variety of historical data.
Enhancing competitiveness through the introduction of a
limited number of statewide races has a number of advantages.
First, it will increase the number of competitive contests without
radically altering the basic winner take all single district system.
While this might seem a weakness to advocates of more far
reaching change, such as the introduction of proportional voting,12
it does not require a wholesale shift in our political thinking.
Indeed, as discussed below, the United States had statewide atlarge elections for the House of Representatives as late as the
1960's.
Second, the proposal is simple and straightforward, raising no
difficult questions of legal interpretation and imposing no
significant new administrative burdens on the States. Third, its
limited scope preserves the federal system of regulation set out in
Article I, Section 4, and would not prevent other reform proposals
for the essentially intact district system from going forward at
either the state or federal level. Fourth, the creation of statewide
contested elections means that the voice of the independent voter,
whose influence is almost completely negated under the current
districting system, will be heard. Fifth, the proposal will provide a
mechanism for party accountability in House elections that the
current system does not provide. Finally, the creation of a limited
number of at-large representatives may well have important
incidental benefits. For example, the creation of a limited number
of statewide elected representatives could result in a larger pool
for the emergence of national leadership.
12. For an interesting discussion of alternatives to the current single
district winner take all system, see Richard L. Engstrom, Missing the Target:
The Supreme Court, "One Person, One Vote," and Partisan Gerrymandering,
in REDISTRICTING IN THE NEW MILLENNIuM 313-340 (Peter F. Galderisi ed.,

2005).
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While bills have been introduced in Congress in the last
twenty years aimed at reforming the redistricting process," and
while a number of model initiatives have been proposed to
address, in part, the issue at a state level, 4 no serious effort has
been made by the congressional leadership of either party to pass
these bills.
In 2005, however, Representative John Tanner,
Democrat from Tennessee, introduced a comprehensive reform
proposal that has attracted two Republican co-sponsors, Phil
Gingrey of Georgia and Zach Wamp of Tennessee.1 On March 1,
2006 Senator Tim Johnson, Democrat from South Dakota,
introduced an identical bill in the Senate. 6 The bills are currently
in the House and Senate Judiciary Committees respectively.
Whether these bills will result in a serious consideration of this
issue remains to be seen, but given the growing public interest in
this subject, some form of federal legislation seems a reasonable
possibility.
In Part I, this article briefly explains how we arrived at our
current situation and why it is unlikely to change without
congressional intervention. Part II presents historical evidence to
support the premise that statewide races will increase the number
of competitive elections. Part III proposes a numerical goal for
competitive elections, then suggests a way of establishing a
"competitiveness" rating for evaluating state election results and
applies that measurement to the 2002 congressional election
results for the states covered by the proposal. By assuming that
the statewide results in 2002 would have mirrored those of
statewide at-large races had the proposal been in effect in 2002,
the increase in the number of competitive districts in 2002 that
would have occurred under the proposal is measured. Part IV
discusses in more detail the advantages of the proposal. Part V
discusses potential drawbacks to the proposal and also discusses
possible alternatives to and variations on the proposal.

13. See H.R. 1711, 101st Cong. (1st Sess. 1989) (introduced in April 1989 by
Mr. Sensenbrenner "to provide for an equitable procedure for establishing
congressional districts"); see also S. 2595, 101st Cong. (2d Sess. 1990)
(introduced in May 1990 by Mr. McConnell and including a proposed Section
205 to limit gerrymandering); H.R. 1173, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999) (seeking
"to provide that States may use redistricting systems for Congressional

districts other than single member districts").
14. See, e.g., THE REFORM INSTITUTE, BEYOND PARTY LINES: PRINCIPLES
FOR REDISTRICTING REFORM (2005), available at www.reforminstitute.
org/resources/Report7.pdf; Fairvote.org, Model State Redistricting Reform
Criteria, http//www.fairvote.org/?page=1429.
15. H.R. 2642, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
16. S. 2350, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006).
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How WE GOT HERE, AND WHY IT WON'T CHANGE ABSENT
FEDERAL LEGISLATION

That we have arrived at a landscape almost totally devoid of
competitive elections is primarily attributable to two factors.
First, incumbent congressmen possess tremendous advantages
over would-be challengers that only grow over time. These include
the opportunity to perform constituent service, name recognition,
greater ability to raise money, ability to craft an image with voters
through communications paid for by the government through the
franking privilege, easier access to media exposure, and the
opportunity to bring home the bacon for the district in an
institution where power and influence grow with seniority. While
political scientists debate how many actual votes these advantages
translate into, 7 there is no doubt that the amount is significant.
The second factor is the greatly enhanced ability of
legislatures, and other interested observers and participants,
through the use of powerful new computers and detailed
databases, to manipulate district lines to assure desired election
results. The current situation has been colorfully (and accurately)
described this way:
The professionalization of American politics generally is mirrored by
the professionalization of redistricting. Gone are the political hacks
who have worked the neighborhoods for years, replaced by massive
computerized data sets containing ten years of precinct returns
merged to census tracts and blocks. Now there are multitudes of
redistricting consultants who work the computers, high-priced
lawyers who advise on the myriad constitutional and legal
constraints, moonlighting social scientists who run racial
polarization tests and provide expert testimony should the plan end
up in court, and in some places, community consultants who set up
redistricting hearings and make sure that the right groups are
invited to testify. Redistricting has opened up a multi-Million-dollar
industry for all of these folks in a way that could not possibly have
been anticipated by Chief Justice Warren and his colleagues on the
Court in the mid-1960's.18
Even when competitive districts somehow bloom, their time in the
sun can be a brief one. An example from the 2000 round of
redistricting will suffice to illustrate how the current situation has
evolved.
In 1998, Rush Holt, a Democrat, was initially elected in New
Jersey's historically Republican 12th District with 50.1% of the
17. For an interesting analysis of this subject, see Scott W. Desposato &
John R. Petrocik, Redistricting and Incumbency: The New Voter Effect, in
REDISTRICTING IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM, supra note 12, at 35-65.
18. Peter F. Galderisi & Bruce Cain, Introduction: Redistricting Past,
Present, and Future, in REDISTRICTING IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM, supra note

12, at 5.
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vote against 47.3%19 for his Republican opponent, a one-term
incumbent who had replaced long-time Republican Dick Zimmer 0
In 2000, Zimmer tried to regain his seat but lost to Holt by 700
votes, one of the closest races in the country. 1
For the
redistricting following the 2000 census, the permanent bipartisan
commission responsible for redistricting in New Jersey made clear
that any bipartisan agreement among New Jersey's Congressional
delegation would be presumed politically fair and given great
weight.' A bipartisan agreement was reached; understandably,
one of the key Democratic goals was to make Rush Holt's seat
safer. As a result, some solidly Democratic areas (although not
quite as many as requested) were added to Holt's district. In 2002,
he was elected by a margin of more than 41,000 votes.23
While New Jersey's Commission system is not the norm, the
fact is that whenever parties share power, incumbent protection
becomes the common value that unites both sides. What is less
expected is how partisan gerrymanders (resulting when one party
has complete control of the redistricting process) also eliminate
competitive districts. Theoretically, a maximally effective partisan
gerrymander could require numerous competitive races. For
example, in a state with fifty-one percent Democrats and fortynine percent Republicans, the perfect gerrymander would produce
an entire delegation of Democrats winning by two percent of the
vote. In reality, most partisan gerrymanders work by providing
overwhelming safety for the minority party in as few districts as
19. All election results in this paragraph are calculated using the Statistics
of the Congressional Election that have been compiled for the given year by
the Clerk of the House of Representatives. See, e.g., CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES,

STATISTICS

OF

THE

CONGRESSIONAL

ELECTION

OF

NOVEMBER 5 (2002), http://clerk.house.gov/members/electionlnfo/2002election.
pdf.
20. Zimmer had given up his seat during an unsuccessful run for the
United States Senate.
21. The closest race in the country in 2002, Colorado's Seventh District,
also provides an example of how competitive districts disappear.
The
Republican, Bob Beauprez, won that year by less than 150 votes. This highly
competitive district was the creation of a court ordered plan promulgated in
January 2002 after the legislature was unable to agree on a plan. In 2003, the
newly elected Republican dominated legislature added heavily Republican
areas of Arapahoe County to the 7th District and removed certain Democratic
areas. In 2004, Representative Beauprez won by 29,000 votes. THE ALMANAC
OF AMERICAN POLITICS, 2004 326-28 (Michael Barone et. al. eds., 2004).
22. Donald Scarinci & Nomi Lowy, Congressional Redistricting in New
Jersey, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 821, 829 (2003).
23. The New Jersey Commission's invitation to Congressional incumbents
in effect to write their own redistricting plan also shows how, in a State where
the difference in the total number of votes cast statewide for Democratic and
Republican candidates for the House was less than 5 points, the closest actual
race was won by a margin of 17 points and the average margin of victory,
excluding the 3 most lopsided Democratic districts, was more than 31 points.
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possible coupled with a smaller but still assured margin of safety
for the in control party in all other districts.
The Texas mid-cycle redistricting of 2003, recently approved
as a constitutional matter in League of United Latin American
24
Citizens v. Perry
provides a good example of how partisan
gerrymanders affect competitiveness. In 2002, a court approved
redistricting plan in Texas resulted in eight races (out of thirtytwo) being decided by a victory margin of less than twenty points
with three being decided by ten points or less. As a result of the
2002 state legislative elections, the Republicans gained complete
control of the state government and revised the redistricting plan
with the sole view of increasing the number of Republican
representatives. These limited revisions to the existing plan for
partisan purposes had a marked impact on the competitiveness
level, reducing the number of races decided by less than twenty
points from eight to five and the number decided by less than ten
points from three to one.
This situation is unlikely to change in the near future without
federal legislation since the forces that produce it - the inherent
advantages of incumbency and the incentive for gerrymandering
(job security and a smooth career path) - will not disappear on
their own. Moreover, the major efforts at reform at the state level
- independent commissions, the adoption of neutral redistricting
criteria, and the adoption of competitiveness as an explicit
redistricting standard - will not necessarily lead to more
competitive elections. Dr. Mann has written that "[diesigning a
commission that is neutral toward or that dampens the influence
of both incumbents and parties is a challenge with which few
states have successfully grappled." 5 He goes on to argue that
"[p]arty control of a state delegation to the U.S. House carries few
benefits, and minor shifts in the partisan composition of the New
Jersey House delegation are unlikely to affect which party is in the
majority in Washington. That encourages bipartisan collaboration
in maintaining the status quo." 6 With mid-cycle gerrymandering
now enjoying Supreme Court approval, there may be further
erosion, if that's possible, in the number of competitive elections as
gerrymandering becomes an even more effective and flexible tool
for manipulating election results.
II.

STATEWIDE AT-LARGE ELECTIONS INCREASE COMPETITIVENESS

Several strands of historical evidence strongly suggest that
statewide at-large elections for Congress in the states covered by
the proposal will be much more competitive than district elections.

24. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006).
25. Mann, supra note 5, at 101.
26. Id. at 105.
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The first strand involves a comparison of the margins of victory in
statewide contests for governor and senator in 2002 (and 2004
where necessary to establish a statewide margin) with average
victory margins in the district races for Congress in 2002. The
second strand compares this same average margin of victory in
District races for 2002 with the total vote each party received in
the aggregate in that state in House elections that year. A third
strand discusses the last statewide at-large congressional elections
that occurred in 1962 and 1964. Finally, I point out certain data
to show how much more mixed in general statewide election
results are than the results of the heavily gerrymandered,
incumbent protected districts that currently exist.
A. DistrictRaces versus Statewide Races
Table A of the Appendix compares the average margin of
victory in 2002 Congressional races in each of the twenty-one
states that would have had at-large elections in 2002 under the
proposal with the margin of victory in statewide contests for
Governor and Senator in 2002 (2004 if there were no state races in
2002).27 It should be noted that districts in which the margin of
victory was sixty points or better, including races in which there
was no opposition from the other major party, were excluded from
computing the average margin of victory for district races to avoid
overstating those margins. The results are striking but not
unexpected. In thirteen of the twenty-one states the average
margin in district race(s) exceeded by at least twenty points the
margin in the state race(s)and in another five states there was a
difference of between ten and twenty points.
The results are even more revealing when states are analyzed
individually. In Tennessee, only one district race out of nine was
decided by less than thirty points; yet, the gubernatorial race was
decided by three points and the senatorial race less than ten
points. In Missouri, no congressional race was decided by less
than twenty points and the average margin of victory was 36.32
points; meanwhile, the governor's race in 2002 was decided by
three points. In Minnesota, the average margin of victory in the
district races was 30.58 points while 7.91 points decided the
gubernatorial race. Similar dramatic differences can be seen in
the results of Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio, and California.
Less
dramatic but still significant differences were recorded in Florida,
New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas.

27. 2002 was used because it was the first election following the most
recent round of redistricting and also because it was not a presidential election
year; therefore, the closeness the presidential elections in 2000 and 2004

would not have influenced the results.
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Even in highly one-sided states, statewide races hold out the
prospect of greater competition. In Massachusetts, for example, no
Republican was elected to Congress from the entire state in 2002,
and the average margin of victory in the five of ten races in which
there was any Republican opposition at all was twenty-four points.
Yet, in 2002 the voters also elected a Republican governor by a
margin of 4.3 percentage points.
We know how close the presidential election results were in
both Florida and Ohio in 2000.' Yet, in 2002 no congressional
race in Ohio was decided by less than seventeen points and the
average margin of victory was 37.4 points. While Florida had
three out of twenty-five races in 2002 decided by ten points or less,
the average margin of victory was still 28.78 points and nineteen
out of twenty-five races were decided by a margin of twenty points
or greater. If Congress were to adopt the proposal discussed
herein, there is no reason to believe that the dynamics of statewide
races for the House would differ radically from those at work in
gubernatorial and U.S. Senate races.
B. DistrictRaces versus Aggregate PartisanVote.
Included as Table B of the Appendix is a chart comparing the
average margin of victory in district races in each state shown in
Table A with the aggregate vote received by each party's
candidates for Congress statewide. Again, the results strikingly
show how many states, which are closely divided in the aggregate,
have resolved themselves into a series of partisan fiefdoms. The
results are particularly notable for some of the larger states. In
Michigan, for example, the average margin of victory in the
Congressional races was 33.8 points while the difference in the
aggregate vote statewide was 1.1 points. Similar differences
occurred in Illinois, Ohio, California, New York, and Texas.
Smaller states showing very significant differences included
Maryland, New Jersey, Minnesota, Missouri, and Tennessee.
C. Results from the 1960's At-large Elections
Prior to the adoption of the one man, one vote rule, statewide
at-large elections for the House of Representatives would occur, as
a matter of course, when states gained House seats following a
census and the Legislature was unable to agree on a redistricting
plan.29 Therefore, we have a body of evidence that allows us to
28. President Bush won in Florida by 537 votes out of 5,825,043 votes cast;
he won Ohio with 50.0% of the votes to 46.4 for Al Gore and 2.5% for the Green
Party. Alice V. McGillivray, Richard M. Scammon & Rhodes Cook, AMERICA AT
THE POLLS, 1960-2000, JOHN F. KENNEDY TO GEORGE W. BUSH, A HANDBOOK
OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION STATISTICS (2001).

29. Gary Cox, On the Systemic Consequences of Redistrictingin the 1960's,
in REDISTRICTING IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM, supra note 12, at 17-19.
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directly compare at-large results with District results in the same
election year.
Five at-large congressional elections were held in 1962. 3' Four
resulted from a gain, following the 1960 census, of one House seat
each in Ohio, Michigan, Maryland, and Texas. The fifth at-large
election was in Connecticut, which had been holding one at-large
election since 1932 when Connecticut gained a sixth seat. The
Connecticut experience is discussed below, but the experiences of
Ohio and Michigan are particularly instructive as well."
In Michigan, the 1962 at-large election was decided by a
margin of 4.1 percentage points.
That was the closest
congressional race in Michigan that year and the average margin
of victory in district races (again excluding races decided by more
than sixty percentage points) was 22.58 points. There was no atlarge election in Michigan in 1964, since a redistricting plan
creating the additional district was effectuated prior to that date.
In Ohio, Republican Robert Taft Jr., a hallowed name in Ohio
politics, won the at-large election in 1962 by a margin of twentyone points. However, in 1964, a big year for the Democratic Party,
a Democrat, Robert Sweeney, defeated the Republican Oliver
Bolton by 4.4 points, a swing in one election from the Democrats to
the Republicans of approximately twenty-five points.
This fluidity of statewide results from one election cycle to the
next is one of the two keys to the likely increase in competitiveness
that would result from statewide at-large elections. The other key
is the absence in the first place of district lines drawn to benefit a
particular party or incumbent.
The history of Connecticut's at-large election is also
instructive. A total of twenty-one at-large elections were held in
Connecticut between 1932 and 1962. During the eight elections
occurring between 1932 and 1946, the at-large seat changed hands
from one party to the other seven times. In only one election
(1936) did the party holding the seat manage to keep it. After
Antoni Sadlak gained the seat for the Republicans in 1946, he
managed to hold on to the seat until he was beaten in the
Democratic tide of 1958. But what is interesting is the relatively
little advantage he gained from incumbency, as evidenced by the
fact that though he won in 1946 by almost fifteen points, he won in

30. All calculations in this Section are based on election results from 2
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS (Jon L. Moore et. al.

eds., 4th ed. 2001).
31. Texas was a one party, Democratic state in 1962. Nevertheless, even
its results are illustrative: in 1962 the at-large Democrat won by 12.2
percentage points; that year only three of the District races out of twenty-two
were as close. In Maryland, the at-large race was decided by 11.4 points in
2002 which was closer than all but two of the seven Maryland District races
that year.
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1948 by less than half a point, in 1950 by four-fifths of a point, and
in 1954 by two points. 2
D. Lack of PartisanUniformity in Statewide Results.
District elections are predictable for a number of reasons and
skillful gerrymandering to achieve a desired result is an important
but not the only reason. Districts that are homogeneous, either
because their voters share common economic or other interests or
because they are majority-minority districts, will often be
predictable in their voting patterns as well.
State results are much less predictable, certainly along party
lines, because while districts are often characterized by
homogeneity, states, particularly the more populous states, are
not. For example, as of October 2006, in only seventeen out of fifty
states did one party hold both U.S. Senate seats and also the
governorship." In thirteen states, the Senate seats were divided
between the parties.3 In eleven states the party holding a two-toone edge for the two Senate seats and the governorship lost the
presidential vote in 2004.. In 2000, Al Gore carried Michigan,
Illinois, New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. That year,
each of those states had a Republican governor.36
To summarize, the results strongly support the position that
the introduction of a relatively limited number of statewide atlarge elections for the House of Representatives could significantly
increase the number of competitive elections for the House.
Undoubtedly, anomalous results affect the individual tabulations
in one year for any state. But viewed in the aggregate, these
results confirm what is perhaps intuitively plain in any event namely, that elections are bound to result in more fluid and
competitive electoral contests when self-interested legislators
cannot manipulate the voting profiles of their constituents.

32. It should be noted that while these were remarkably close races for an
incumbent, Connecticut congressional district races in general were very
competitive during this period.
33. The seventeen states are: Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho,

Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, South
Carolina, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin.

See

generally, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS, 2006 (Michael Barone et. al.
eds., 2006).

34. The thirteen states are: Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana,
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island
and South Dakota. See generally id.
35. The eleven states are: Arkansas, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota,
Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Pennsylvania and
Rhode Island. See generally id.
36. The Governors were George Ryan (Ill.), Argeo Cellucci (Mass.),
Christine Whitman (N.J.), George Pataki (N.Y.), and Tom Ridge (Pa.). 33
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 15 (2001).

20061

Making Our CongressionalElections More Competitive

1437

III. THE PROPOSAL, AND How IT WOULD HAVE WORKED IN 2002

If statewide at-large elections will produce a more competitive
landscape, the next question is how competitive a landscape do we
want. I suggest, as a standard that either (i) one out of every five
races should be very competitive, defining a very competitive race
as one where the percentage point margin between the candidates
of the two major parties is less than ten points, or (ii) two out of
every five races should be competitive, defining a competitive race
as one where the margin is less than twenty points. This level of
competitiveness would do much to assure that each election cycle
would constitute a referendum on the performance of the House of
Representatives, particularly, but not exclusively, the performance
of the majority party.
How do the states affected by the proposal stack up against
this standard? To make this determination, I have developed a
very simple method of rating and comparing state election results
for competitiveness. For each Congressional race in 2002 decided
by less than ten percentage points, states were awarded two
points, for each race decided by more than ten but less than
twenty percentage points, one point was awarded. The total
number of points earned was divided by the maximum number of
points a state could earn under the system (two times the number
of districts in the state) to calculate the State's competitiveness
rating. The results are set forth in Table C in the Appendix.
A state meeting the competitiveness standard would have a
rating of 0.200, but, as can be seen from the table, sixteen of the
twenty-one states failed to meet this very lenient standard. There
are a total of 338 congressional districts in the twenty-one states
covered by the Proposal. If each state just met the standard, then
the states would have a combined score of 135.2 (calculated by
multiplying 338 x 2 and multiplying the result, 676, by 0.200). In
actuality, the states achieved a combined competitiveness score of
seventy-seven for the 2002 elections.
The largest states generally had the worst competitiveness
rating. California was almost in a class by itself having only one
race out of fifty-three under ten points and only two additional
races below twenty points. Or consider that four states (Missouri,
Massachusetts, Virginia, and Wisconsin) had no races decided by
less than twenty points, and two more (Michigan and Ohio) had no
races decided by less than ten points.
To measure the impact of the proposal on the competitiveness
rating of each state had it been in effect in 2002, I assumed that
the congressional statewide races would have mirrored the
statewide party vote in U.S. Senate and gubernatorial races for
that year (or for 2004 if there were no statewide elections in 2002).
If there were two statewide elections, the results were averaged.
Also, it was assumed the state would have the same number of
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elections decided by less than ten and twenty points as it had
without the proposal being in effect, except that for each of the five
states with a competitiveness rating of at least 0.200 for the actual
2002 results, one point was subtracted from its total to compute
the revised competitiveness rating. This subtraction is necessary
because states with an already high competitive rating are more
likely to lose a competitive district than ones with a lower rating.
As Table C shows, the introduction of the thirty-three at-large
elections would have resulted in an increase in very competitive
elections from twenty-five to forty-two and competitive elections
from twenty-seven, to thirty-five. To put the revised rating in raw
score terms, the proposal would have increased the combined score
of the twenty-one states from 77 to 119, still short of the goal but
substantially better.
IV. ADVANTAGES OF THE PROPOSAL

The proposal should be adopted because it is the most direct,
but least federally intrusive way of creating more competitive
congressional elections. The key advantages of the proposal are
discussed below.
A. Accommodating Increased Competition with Incumbent
Protection
Many commentators argue that incumbent protection is
positive because it advances the goal of a stable two party system,
assures continuity in policy making, provides a cadre of
experienced representatives, and encourages able individuals to
continue in public office.37 Others disagree." A major virtue of the
proposal is that it does not require the resolution of this long
running debate since it will likely increase the number of
competitive congressional elections without significantly altering
the current district system. At the same time, as discussed below,
it would not preclude other reform proposals from going forward to
deal with the vast majority of elections that would still continue at
the district level.
Given that the current congressional districting system is
essentially preserved, all the positive aspects, which some
commentators attribute to incumbent protection, would still be in
place, subject, of course, to whatever additional refinements
(independent commissions, neutral criteria) that individual states
might apply to their system. But the price of incumbent protection

37. E.g., Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The
Case for Judicial Acquiescence of Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116
HARv. L. REV. 649 (2002).
38. E.g., Issacharoff, supra note 1.
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and partisan gerrymandering, in terms of non-competitive
elections, would no longer be quite as high.
In one respect, the proposal may actually protect incumbents
by enabling an out-of-power party to preserve key incumbents who
are the intended victims of a partisan gerrymander by the party in
control. One of the key strategies for effectuating severe partisan
gerrymanders is to pit incumbents of the victim party against each
other in the same district under the new redistricting plan. Atlarge elections would afford incumbents pitted against each other
the opportunity for both to be returned to Congress since one could
choose to run in an at-large election. In fact, the opportunity to
run statewide might provide the more ambitious incumbent an
opportunity to gain wider recognition, a helpful stepping-stone to
higher office. Thus, at-large elections might mitigate one of the
more perverse effects of severe partisan gerrymanders and
actually protect worthy incumbents. "Worthy" is a fair choice of
words here given that the intended incumbent victim would only
be returned if he or she could win a statewide contest.
The proposal would even afford a final chance for incumbents
gerrymandered out of existence by their own party. Consider for a
moment the case of Ben Gilman, a moderate, well respected fifteen
term Republican Congressman from New York. When New York
lost two seats as a result of the reallocation of seats among the
states following the 2000 census, Mr. Gilman was the victim of a
gerrymander engineered in part by his own party whose leaders
apparently were afraid his district would go Democratic once he
retired.39 "In effect, Gilman's district was carved up among his
neighbors."' With a limited at-large system, Mr. Gilman at least
might have had a shot at continuing his congressional service.
B. Legal and Straightforward
There is no question that statewide at-large elections pass
constitutional muster. Congressional authority to enact electoral
regulations is well established.41
If Congress has the
constitutional authority to require districts to adopt a winnertake-all, single district system, it certainly has the authority to
modestly modify the system to address one of its most pernicious
effects.42
Moreover, the system will not add any additional

39. See THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS, 2004, supra note 22, at 1155-

56.
40. Id. at 1156.
41. See Ex Parte Siebold 100 U.S. 717 (1879) (confirming Congressional
authority to enact criminal penalties for federal election violations).
42. Professor Paul McGreal argues that the constitutionality of the federal
statute requiring single member districts has been called into question by
recent Supreme Court precedents returning certain powers to state
governments. See generally Paul E. McGreal, Unconstitutional Politics, 76

1440

The John Marshall Law Review

[39:1425

administrative burdens.
The proposal simply requires the
elimination of a specified number of districts from the redistricting
plan. In any given state, the resulting redistricting plan may be
made more or less complicated by the reduced number of districts
but it certainly does not raise, with one possible exception, any
issues that are qualitatively different than those that would occur
with any redistricting. The one exception relates to the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 as amended; specifically, the possible argument
that at-large districts might constitute minority influence districts
under certain circumstances. This argument is not persuasive but
it does add a possible new dimension to Section 2 (vote dilution)
and Section 5 (retrogression) cases under the Voting Rights Act.
C. A National Solution that Preserves the Federal System
intended by the Framers
The creation of a limited number of at-large districts does not
preclude, and may even encourage, reform of the congressional
single district system. Since the districting system would still be
in place, proposals at the state level aimed at decreasing partisan
gerrymandering, increasing the transparency of the process, and
continuing the reduction in excessive incumbent protection lose
none of their credibility or importance.
The federal statute proposed in this article is an attempt to
address a serious national problem - namely, the unacceptably
low number of competitive congressional elections in the very body
of our national government that was supposed to be, through
frequent elections, most responsive to the changing views of the
people.u
This is a problem that transcends the capacity of
individual states and their ability to deal effectively with it, and in
some sense, it is not their problem.
In the Federalist Papers, Madison showed that the Framers
viewed the House and the Senate in fundamentally different ways,
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 519 (2001).

While this is not the place to comment
extensively on Professor McGreal's article, I will note that I do not share his
view, given that the manner of electing the nation's representatives seems to
be very much a matter of national import for which the Constitution clearly
gives the Congress supervisory power. The fact that the basic statutory
scheme has been in effect since 1842 argues strongly against the likelihood of
its being overturned now on the grounds suggested. Hamilton's FederalistNo.
59, also undercuts, in my view, Professor McGreal's position: "Nothing can be
more evident than that an exclusive power of regulating elections for the
national government, in the hands of the State legislatures, would leave the
existence of the Union entirely at their mercy." THE FEDERALIST No. 59, at
363 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also Jamal Greene,
Judging Partisan Gerrymanders under the Elections Clause, 114 YALE L. J.
1021, 1030-34 (2005) (providing a valuable account of the adoption of the
elections clause at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and the subsequent
debate over its merits at the state ratifying conventions).
43. See THE FEDERALIST No. 57 (James Madision).
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which has real implications for our subject. In Federalist No. 39,
Madison writes:
The House of Representatives will derive its powers from the people
of America; and the People will be represented in the same
proportion, and on the same principle, as they are in the legislature
of a particular State. So far the government is national, not federal.
The Senate, on the other hand will derive its powers from the
States, as political and coequal Societies ....
Congress was given broad residual power to regulate the time,
place, and manner of holding elections for the House precisely
because the Framers feared manipulative devices by the states
that could undo the structural framework they were creating.45
This is precisely what has happened over a period of decades.
While it cries out for correction, it can be corrected in a way that
does not do great violence to the other clear intent of the Framers;
namely, that for the most part the time, place, and manner of
holding elections be left to the states.
D.

Fairnessto the Independent Voter

All voters are victims when election outcomes are fixed in
advance because elections are intended to provide the
accountability that fixed outcomes are intended to avert.
Independent voters arguably suffer a particular affront since they
are more prone than other voters to look beyond party
identification.' Committed Democratic and Republican voters,
even when a minority in a lopsided district, achieve what is
sometimes referred to as "virtual representation"47 since even the
most partisan gerrymanders will result in some safe seats for their
party. Not so for the independent voter whose vote is simply not
needed in the vast majority of congressional districts today, which
have been drawn to be safe for one of the two major parties.
As described above, since the creation of at-large districts will
almost assuredly result in more competitive elections, independent
voters will be courted and may often provide the crucial margin of
victory. In a 2004 National Election Studies survey of partisan
identification, forty percent of those surveyed classified themselves

44. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 244 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (emphasis in original).
45. See U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 791-92 (1995)
(discussing the founders' intent with regard to the federal system).
46. Elsewhere, I have argued, among other things, that a state-redistricting
plan containing virtually no competitive contests violates the equal protection
rights of independent voters. Walter Frank, Help Wanted: the Constitutional
Case Againt Gerrymandering to Protect Congressional Incumbents, 32 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 227, 241-46 (2006).
47. Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting is Different, 84 CAL.
L. REV. 1201, 1209 (1996).
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as independent."
Of this group, when asked whether they
considered themselves closer to the Democratic or Republican
parties, approximately twenty-five percent did not think of
themselves as closer to either party, roughly thirty-two percent
thought themselves closer to the Republicans and forty-three
percent closer to the Democrats.49
It would seem a fair assumption that voters who initially
classified themselves as independent would be willing to vote for
candidates of either party even if they viewed themselves as closer
to one of the parties. Thus, statewide at-large elections will give a
meaningful voice to the roughly 40% of the voting population who
have been effectively exiled from the current system of electing
congressional representatives.
E.

Strengthening the Two Party System

There are two strong reasons for believing that at-large state
congressional races could largely become referenda on the
performance of the party in power in Congress. First, nonpartisan factors such as a personal following based on constituent
service and the ability to bring home the bacon for the district
would be less important at the statewide level with its much
greater population, particularly given that all voters would still be
represented by a district congressman with district offices to whom
they could turn for assistance.
Second, at-large representatives would occupy an interesting
niche in the governmental structure. They would certainly not, as
already noted, be as service oriented as district elected
representatives but neither would they be expected to have the
institutional influence of United States Senators since they would
still be 1 of 435, not 1 of 100. Without the incumbent advantages
arising from constituent service and success in representing
district interests, at-large representatives would likely be defined
primarily by their positions on public issues. They would in turn
have a particularly strong interest in broadening their party's
appeal and assuring that the party took positions consistent with
the views of the state's voters. Thus, at-large elections would very
likely turn on which party best represented the thinking of a
majority of the state's voters.
At-large districts would contribute to a stable two party
system for an additional reason. Political commentators all along
the spectrum have commented on the tendency of the current,
highly-gerrymandered system to exaggerate the influence of the
48. See HAROLD W. STANLEY & RICHARD G. NIEMI, VITAL STATISTICS ON
AMERICAN POLITICS 2005-2006 116 (providing statistics calculated from
National Election Studies data collected by the Center for Political Studies at
the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor).
49. Id.
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more ideologically fervent members of the two parties." This
influence is the direct result of the fact that when incumbents are
virtually guaranteed re-election, their main vulnerability lies, as
noted by Professor McConnell,5 in the nominating process in
which usually only the most fervent of partisans participate.
Thus, the current system produces candidates with a built in bias,
based on self-interest, to cater to their party's ideological
At-large districts would likely prove an effective
partisans.
counterweight to this phenomenon since statewide candidates,
particularly in states fairly evenly divided along partisan lines,
would want to appeal to as many moderate and independent
voters as possible.
A number of Supreme Court Justices have referred to the
That
broad, non-ideological nature of our major parties.52
description seems to be less and less apt in today's politics.
Whether that is good or bad, the fact remains that as parties
become more ideological, they will inevitably leave gaps that can
only be filled by the evolution of additional political parties. In
fact, Thomas Friedman is confident that if the Democratic and
Republican parties cannot work together on the energy issue,
"there is going to be a third party in the 2008 election. It's going to
be called the Geo-Green Party and it's going to win a lot of centrist
votes."53 A limited, at-large system that restores some bias toward
moderation and breadth by checking the bias favoring the
ideological wings of the two parties, would, in the long run, help
preserve a stable two party system.
F.

More Effective National Leadership

Starting with Theodore Roosevelt, seventeen different
individuals have been elected President. Of these, all but four
(Taft, Hoover, Eisenhower, and George H.W. Bush) were elected to
statewide office as either a governor or U.S. Senator before
assuming the presidency. At present, therefore, the most likely
pool of presidential candidates for both parties will generally
constitute a total of 150 persons (50 governors and 100 U.S.
Senators) currently serving in those positions plus any former
By
occupants of those positions being seriously mentioned.
creating an additional pool of statewide elected national

50. E.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Thou Shall Not Destroy the Center, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 11, 2005, at A 23; Lexington, Slumbering On, THE ECONOMIST,
Apr. 9, 2005, at 28.

51. McConnell, supra note 4, at 113.
52. E.g., Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 769 (1973) (Powell, J.,
dissenting); Colorado Republican Campaign Committee v. Federal Election
Commission, 518 U.S. 604, 647 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
53. Thomas L. Friedman, Gas Pump Geopolitics, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2006,

at A23.
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officeholders, the proposal would at a minimum provide an
additional avenue for wider recognition that could expand the list
of serious presidential prospects.
V. POSSIBLE DRAWBACKS AND ALTERNATIVES

A. ProposalDisadvantages
Repairing a political problem is not like fixing a car.
Changing the brake shoes does not mean that you suddenly have
to start worrying about the engine. Not so with democratic
institutions, which are so deeply interwoven that any institutional
change is often accompanied by other unsought changes.
In the case of the proposal advanced in this article, three
unsought but inevitable impacts come to mind. First, the creation
of statewide at-large elections will reduce the number of
congressional districts in the affected states and thus increase the
number of each representative's constituents in the remaining
districts. The very limited number of at-large elections (thirtythree, leaving 402 districts) created under the proposal, however,
does largely mitigate this concern. In the states for which one atlarge election is proposed, those with eight to fourteen
representatives, the impact will obviously be greatest in the states
with only eight representatives, since only seven districts would
remain to absorb the lost district's population, whereas in a state
with fourteen representatives thirteen districts would absorb the
lost district's population. Under the Proposal, districts would be
somewhere between 7.7% and 14.24% larger than they otherwise
would be but for the introduction of the at-large district.5 The
same ratios would hold for the states required to have two or three
at-large elections under the proposal, although for states with
twenty-eight or more representatives the percentage increase in
district size would be even less than 7.7%, owing to the greater
number of districts absorbing the loss of the three districts. These
levels of increase appear to be a price worth paying for a proposal
that would help restore competitiveness, strengthen the two-party
system, encourage the development of national leaders and give
many more independents a meaningful vote in House elections.
The second likely negative is incidental and difficult to
quantify, but deserves mention: the increase in cost of at-large
statewide races in comparison to district races. One might argue

54. Consider, for example, a state of eight districts with 100 people in total,
or 12.5 people per district. Spreading those 100 people over seven districts
would increase each district's size to 14.2 people, an increase of 14.24%.
Assuming a fourteen district state with 12.5 persons per district reduced to
thirteen districts would mean an increase in district size to 13.46 persons per

district, an increase of 7.68%.
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that the amount of money that can be raised in any congressional
election cycle is finite and that the introduction of at-large
elections will likely have a negligible effect on the total cost of an
election. It might also be possible to develop special public funding
provisions for at-large elections that could serve as a model for
other offices. In any event, the financial impact is too conjectural
and incidental to affect the merits of the proposal.
Finally, the proposal could be seen as unfair to the more
populous states since it arguably weakens their opportunities for
In an institution where power and
incumbent protection.
influence accompany seniority, this is potentially a serious
consideration. Based on the proposal's modest numbers, however,
I would submit that this difficulty is primarily theoretical, but it is
a potential issue for anyone who might advocate the creation of
significantly more at-large elections for the populous states.
B. Possible Variations
Another possible route to the goal of more competitive
elections would be for Congress to mandate that competitiveness
be included as a criteria in drawing district lines or, even more
directly, to require that a certain proportion of districts be drawn
with a roughly equal percentage of registered Democrats and
Republicans, subject to the requirements of one person, one vote
and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
A general mandate to include competitiveness is superficially
appealing. But it is not difficult to imagine legal and political
controversies arising as to whether a given districting plan gave
sufficient weight to this requirement. Moreover, a criterion of
competitiveness could still be manipulated when one party
controls the redistricting process party since nothing would
prevent the competitive districts from coming at the expense of the
Indeed, the requirement of
minority party's incumbents.
competitive districts could force a partisan gerrymander to be
more aggressive than it might otherwise have been by limiting the
possibility of creating overwhelmingly safe districts for the
minority party. Also, when one party controls the process, it is
likely that even competitive districts will be shaped in subtle ways
to give an advantage to the party controlling the gerrymander.
Requiring that a particular proportion of districts be drawn with
roughly equal Democrats and Republicans is a more definite way
of mandating competitiveness and has the virtue of clarity but
would still be subject to manipulation in the case of partisan
gerrymandering.
Simply mandating competitiveness could also produce very
one-sided delegations, particularly in states where either party
enjoys a substantial advantage. If the competitive districts go in
favor of the majority party, most of the other districts in the state
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would likely go for the majority party as well, given that many
minority party votes would have been wasted in the lost
competitive races.
One possible variation of the proposal would be to provide the
states with an option to introduce a limited number of statewide
at-large districts, but not to mandate them. However, the success
of the proposal would then depend on the extent to which it is
adopted by the states and, therefore, defeat its main purpose - to
assure an increase in competitive elections. Moreover, piecemeal
adoption by some states, but not others could produce overall
unfairness to one of the two major parties depending on who
controls what legislatures and governorships. Also, if mid-cycle
redistricting becomes more prevalent, at-large districts could
appear and disappear to satisfy the needs of the party in power.
C. The Tanner Bill
The Tanner Bill" would require each state to appoint an
Independent Redistricting Commission responsible for developing
a redistricting plan. The Commission would consist of an equal
number of members appointed by the Democratic and Republican
parties plus a chairperson to be agreed upon by the members
appointed by the two parties. The chair would be the deciding vote
if the commission members from the two parties could not agree
on a redistricting plan. The plan developed by the Commission
would be submitted to the legislature for approval or rejection but
would not be subject to amendment.
In addition to adhering to the one person, one vote standard
and the applicable requirements of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
the Bill designates continuity of political subdivisions, continuity
of neighborhoods, compactness and contiguity as criteria for the
plan. The Bill specifically forbids the Commission from taking
into account the voting history or political party affiliation of the
district or the residence of incumbents,56 except that the Bill
provides that voting history can be taken into account "to the
extent necessary to comply with any State law which requires the
establishment of competitive Congressional districts."57 Provision
is made for the adoption of a plan by the judiciary if the

55. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
56. The clause in the bill prohibiting an independent commission from
considering the residence of incumbent members in drawing a redistricting
plan could, if taken seriously, inaugurate a minor electoral revolution. The

intent of this provision is not entirely clear. It may have been intended simply
to prohibit district plans aimed at pitting incumbents against each other; but
such a provision would hardly be necessary given that the state legislature
would no longer drawing district boundaries under the Tanner bill.

57. H.R. 2642, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
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Commission is never appointed or a plan is not timely adopted in
accordance with the dates established by the Bill.
The Tanner Bill is a thoughtful attempt to limit partisan and
incumbent gerrymandering. It is based on the premise that it is
possible to create politically fair districts based upon purely
neutral criteria. There are some who dispute this premise, arguing
that it is impossible to produce truly neutral criteria.' But the
Bill's exception for taking into account voting history for the
purpose of creating competitive districts only comes into play if a
state chooses to make competitiveness a criterion. Nothing in the
Tanner Bill directly requires the states to make competitiveness a
criterion. The Tanner Bill ultimately seeks to make districting a
technical, non-partisan exercise. Whether, as a practical matter
this is truly possible would, if the Bill were enacted, await the
verdict of time.
One potential danger implicit in the Tanner Bill could
actually be alleviated by the creation of a limited number of
statewide at-large races.
The Tanner Bill, for all its good
intentions, has the potential of actually locking a state into a
pattern in which the actual voting strength of the two parties in
state is not fairly reflected by the redistricting plan. There is no
reason why a facially neutral system based on geographical factors
could not lock in a pattern in which one of the two parties
consistently failed to achieve seats reflecting its voting strength
statewide. A modest number of statewide at-large districts would
act as a potential counterweight to this possibility, particularly in
the case of a majority party which was not getting its fair share of
seats, since presumably, as the majority party in the state, it
would have the better chance of winning at-large seats.
In summary, the Tanner Bill is not a substitute for the
proposal being advanced in this article since it does not directly
attack the issue of competitiveness. Additionally, the at-large
elections being proposed could actually mitigate one of the
potential difficulties inherent in the reliance on neutral geographic
criteria that is the foundation of the Tanner Bill.
CONCLUSION

The two houses of Congress are now elected in ways
diametrically opposed to how they were chosen at the outset of the
Republic. Then, the Senate was chosen by the state legislatures
and the House of Representatives by the people. Today, the people
58. Robert G. Dixon, Fair Criteria and Procedures for Establishing
Legislative Districts, in REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING ISSUES 7-8

(Bernard Grofman et al. eds., 1982). But see Sally Dworak-Fisher, Drawing
the Line on Incumbency Protection, 2 MICH. J. RACE & LAW 131, 144-147
(1996) (criticizing the view that it is impossible to produce truly neutral
criteria).
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elect the Senate and, for the most part, the state legislatures
choose our representatives.
The noted philosopher, Isaiah Berlin, has written: "Where
ends are agreed, the only questions left are those of means, and
these are not political but technical." 9 The proposal contained in
this article for a limited number of statewide at-large districts
assumes agreement that competition is a good thing or at least
that the level of non-competition that currently exists is a bad
thing. I have proposed in this article a possible way to address
this issue that is simple, direct, limited, and clearly authorized
under the Constitution. Moreover, it is modest in the sense that it
is consistent with our constitutional framework, presents no
overarching federal, mandate, and is unlikely to lead to legal
questions that would bring the judiciary further into the
redistricting process.
It makes no pretense at being an
intellectually satisfying solution, but it is fair, pragmatic, and, I
believe, worthy of serious consideration.

59. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in THE PROPER STUDY OF
MANKIND, AN ANTHOLOGY OF ESSAYS 191 (Henry Hardy & Roger Hausheer
eds., 1998).
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TABLE A
(Asterisks denote elections in 2004)
STATE

AV, MARGIN IN CONG. RACES

MARGINS FOR GOv. AND SEN.

Arizona

26.80

1.04 (Gov.)

Georgia

38.90

5.13 (Gov.); 6.13 (Sen.)

Indiana

23.30

*7.72 (Gov.); *24.42 (Sen.)

Maryland

34.30

3.96 (Gov.)

Massachusetts

32.00

4.30 (Gov.); Unopp. (Sen.)

Minnesota

30.80

7.91 (Gov.)

Missouri

36.32

*2.98 (Gov.)

New Jersey

31.60

9.93 (Sen.)

North Carolina

26.80

8.40 (Sen.)

Tennessee

35.31

3.06 (Gov.); 9.30 (Sen.)

Virginia

33,14

Unopp. (Sen.)

Washington

25.97

*12.24 (Gov.)

Wisconsin

35,04

*11.24 (Sen.)

Illinois

33.04

7.10 (Gov.)

Michigan

33.80

4.02 (Gov.)

Ohio

37.14

19.5 (Sen.)

Pennsylvania

21.20

9.03 (Gev.)

California

35.30

4.86 (Gov.)

Florida

28.78

12.85 (Gav.)

New York

37.80

15.90 (Gev.)

Texas

31.04

17.85 (Gev.); 11.93 (Sen.)

L

a

60. All election statistics for the House of Representatives are, unless
otherwise noted, based on election results provided in CONGRESSIONAL
DISTRICTS IN THE 2000S, A PORTRAIT OF AMERICA (CQ Press ed., 2005). This
volume provided the percentage of each candidate's vote as a share of the total
vote as well as the raw vote for the 2002 elections. Statewide results in
Gubernatorial and Senatorial races for 2002 and 2004 were taken from THE
ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS, 2006 (Michael Barone et. al. eds., 2006).
While the Almanac of American Politics also contained the percentage of each
candidate's vote for the 2002 House elections, they were not carried out to as
many decimal places as Congressional Districts in the 2000s.
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TABLE B

The Column "Av. Margin in Cong. Races" simply repeats the
first column in Table A giving the average margin of victory in a
state's congressional races. "% point diff. in aggregate vote"
describes the percentage vote margin between the two parties
when each party's total votes in all House races in the state are
aggregated. In Georgia, for example, the Republicans received
57.46% of the aggregate vote of the two parties and the Democrats
42.64%, a difference of 14.92 points. The difference between the
two percentages is shown in the column with the majority party
being identified next to the percentage.
TABLE B
STATE

i

AV. MARIGININ CONG. RACES

5, POIN

DI F IN AGGGATE VOTE

Arizona

26.80

18.06 R

Georgia

38.90

14.92 R

Indiana

23.30

13.52 R

Maryland

34.30

9.12 D

Massachusetts

32.00

68.06 D

Minnesota

30.80

3.20 D

Missouri

36.32

8.62 R

New Jersey

31.60

4.88 D

North Carolina

26.80

10.92 R

Tennessee

35.31

4.20 R

Virginia

33.14

36.90 R

Washington

25.97

7.62 D

Wisconsin

35.04

13.54 R

Illinois

33.04

2.44 D

Michigan

33.80

1.10 D

Ohio

37.14

14.28 R

Pennsylvania

21.20

15.90 R

California

35.30

7.26 D

Florida

28.78

16.86 R

New York

37.80

7.62 D

Texas

31.04

9.43 R

2006]

Making Our CongressionalElections More Competitive

TABLE C

The first number in each parenthesis reflects the number of
very competitive races (margin between the two major parties
under ten points) in the 2002 election and the second number
reflects the number of competitive races (margin over ten but
under twenty points). The Competitiveness Rating is calculated
by giving a state two points for each very competitive election and
one point for each competitive election and then dividing the sum
by a number equal to the number of districts in the state
multiplied by two, the maximum number of points a district could
earn.
The Revised Competitiveness Rating reflects the
Competitiveness Rating the state would have earned had the
Proposal been in effect for the 2002 elections. It is calculated by
adding to the state's score the number of at-large elections which
would have been competitive or very competitive assuming that
the margins in the at-large elections would have mirrored results
in the applicable statewide elections for governor and Senator
noted in Table A.
Where there were two statewide elections, an average
statewide margin was calculated and applied. A state with an
initial Competitiveness rating of 0.200 or better had one point
automatically deducted from its score to reflect the higher
probability that it might lose a competitive district under the
proposal since each state under the proposal has fewer districts.
The revised sum was then divided by the same divisor as used to
determine the Competitiveness Rating since the number of total
races had not changed.
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TABLE C

STATE

o

o

COMPETITIVENESS RATING

REVISED RATING

Arizona

0.125 (1+0)

0.250(2+0)

Georgia

0.230 (2+2)

0.290 (3+(2-1))

Indiana

0.440 (4+0)

0.440 (4+(1-1))

Maryland

0.250 (2+0)

0.310 (3+(0-1))

Massachusetts

0.000 (0+0)

0.050 (0+1)

Minnesota

0.125 (1+0)

0.250(2+0)

Missouri

0.000(0+0)

0.111 (1+0)

New Jersey

0.038(0+1)

0.115(1+1)

North Carolina

0.150 (1+2)

0.230(2+2)

Tennessee

0.111 (1+0)

0.222 (2+0)

Virginia

0.000 (0+0)

0.000 (0+0)

Washington

0.220 (1+2)

0.277 (2+(2-1))

Wisconsin

0.000 (0+0)

0.125 (1+0)

Illinois

0.780(1+1)

0.078(1+1)

Michigan

0.066 (0+2)

0.200 (2+2)

Ohio

0.083(0+3)

0.138 (0+5)

Pennsylvania

0.210 (3+2)

0.289 (5+(2-1))

California

0.037 (1+2)

0.094 (4+2)

Florida

0.180 (3+3)

0.240 (3+6)

New York

0.068 (1+2)

0.120(1+5)

Texas

0.177 (3+5)

0.225 (3+8)

